An Insider Threat Categorization Framework for Automated Manufacturing Execution System by Mohammad, Nur Ameera Natasha et al.
International Journal of Innovation in Enterprise System, Volume 3, Issue 02, July 2019, pp 31-41 
 
© Copyright by Directorate of Research and Community Service, Telkom University  
An Insider Threat Categorization Framework for Automated 
Manufacturing Execution System 
 
 
Nur Ameera Natasha Mohammad1, Warusia Mohamed Yassin2, Rabiah Ahmad3, Aslinda Hassan4, and 
Mohammed Nasser Ahmed Al Mhiqani5 
 
1,2,3,4,5Center for Advanced Computing Technology, Fakulti Teknologi Maklumat dan Komunikasi, Universiti Teknikal 
Malaysia Melaka 
 
 ameeramohamad88@gmail.com, s.m.warusia@utem.edu.my, rabiah@utem.edu.my, aslindahassan@utem.edu.my, 
almohaiqny@gmail.com  
 
Corresponding author: Nur Ameera Natasha Mohammad 
Received: 15 September 2018, Accepted: 17 January 2019, Published: 13 July 2019 
 
Abstract—Insider threats become one of the most 
dangerous threats in the cyber world as compared to 
outsider as the insiders have knowledge of assets. In 
addition, the threats itself considered in-visible and no one 
can predict what, when and how exactly the threat 
launched. Based on conducting literature, threat in 
Automated Manufacturing Execution Systems (AMESs) 
can be divided into three principle factors. Moreover, there 
is no standard framework to be referring which exist 
nowadays to categorize such factors in order to identify 
insider threats possible features. Therefore, from the 
conducted literature a standard theoretical categorization of 
insider threats framework for AMESs has been proposed. 
Hence, three principle factors, i.e. Human, Systems and 
Machine have considered as major categorization of insider 
threats. Consequently, the possible features for each factor 
identified based on previous researcher recommendations. 
Therefore, via identifying possible features and categorize 
it into principle factors or groups, a standard framework 
could be derived. These frameworks will contribute more 
benefit specifically in the manufacturing field as a 
reference to mitigate an insider threat.    
Keywords—automated manufacturing execution systems 
insider threats, factors and features, insider threat 
categorization framework. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An insider threats can be defined as a possible 
harm which launch against assets of an organization 
which usually this kind of activity could be divide 
into intentional and unintentional, based on several 
participation of people such as current or former 
employee, supplier, contractor and business partner 
[1].  
Moreover, as contrast to human participation, there 
is also some participation from an-other contributor 
such as in unintentional threat contains malfunction 
of equipment and outsource operation downfall [2]. 
The malfunction of equipment defined as the 
unexpected abnormal operation of hardware or 
devices which directly affect the capability of a 
system to control and keep the private information 
safely due to loss of data loss instantaneous. In 
addition, outsource operation downfall defined as 
failure to protect the security element in outsourcing 
operation which resulting in loss of information 
capability, availability and integrity [2]. Hence, those 
mentioned participation contributor can become as 
threats within organization as these will affect the 
image or reputation of an organization. 
Along with the participation from above 
contributor, [3] has divided the aim of the insider 
threats into three categories, namely motive, 
opportunity and capability. The first element called as 
motive which explained as motivations or 
encouragement of insider attacker to perform threat. 
In addition, the next element so called as an 
opportunity defined as the objective of insider to 
perform threat using the knowledge about an 
organization that insider has gathered.  Moreover, the 
third element called as a capability defined as the 
power of an insider has to launch the threat through 
the accessibility obtained.  For example, previously 
proposed model called Capability Means Opportunity 
(CMO) estimates a person, social, and administrative 
or organizational factor for insider threat detection. 
Moreover, for an effective insider threat case to 
happen, an insider requires the ability to compel a 
threat, the motive to do so, and the opportunity to 
compel the crime [4], [5], [6], [3] For better 
understanding, the abovementioned CMO model has 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1 CMO Model for insider threat detection (adapted from [3]) 
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Based on the Fig. 1, motive explained as predicated 
of evidential circumstances of external circumstances 
that can incite the emotion such as a motive for 
financial and personal gain, revenge, thrill and 
competitive advantage [7], [4], [8]. Besides the 
element of motive, the capability (also can be referred 
as power) of an insider (also can be referred as 
human) has defined as sophistication dimensions of 
insider threats which having right and knowledge 
about how the organizational system works to pass 
the access which may facilitate to launch threat. Other 
than that, opportunity refers as the insider’s ability to 
exploit the weakness or vulnerabilities of 
organizational systems [4]. Therefore, with the 
knowledge of organizational weaknesses such as 
unclear, outdated or nonexistence security policies 
and poor access control configurations on systems 
can lead insiders to launch the attack/harm without 
doubt using this opportunity [4]. Besides that, author 
[9] has defined trigger as unexpected negative events 
that happened around the insiders which can motivate 
themselves to behaving negatively. Some example of 
negative events is losing control, does not receive any 
rewards and promotion. With those negative events 
listed, author [3] reported that the insider can generate 
a negative attitude towards an organization and can 
either create or intensify a motive. 
From these two elements of insider threat 
contributor, an insider can directly perform a 
malicious intention towards an organization 
supported with opportunity and capability an insider 
has. However, without capability and opportunity 
element, an insider obstructed from performing threat 
because of not having knowledge about an 
organization and the power to access inside the 
organization. In contrast, the situation of insider that 
have the knowledge and power to pass through access 
of an organization can be different. As illustrated in 
the proposed CMO model above, those three main 
elements need to be fulfilled by an insider to 
completed insider threats. On the other side of view, 
the element of insider threat contributor from 
illustrated model can be applied by the outsider who 
might have motive and capability to launch any 
threats toward the organization. With a motive to 
harm the organization as encouragement and 
capability to access into an organization, an outsider 
can perform threat easily. Unfortunately, an outsider 
might have possibility to get caught as he/she does 
not know the right place or vulnerabilities 
(opportunity) that suitable for the threat. Therefore, 
for an outsider to perform threat without being 
recognized within an organization will be difficult 
because each of the elements have their own 
contribution to completed insider threat performance. 
Besides the studies on motive, opportunity and 
capability of insider threats by author [3] above, 
author [10] has proposed the insider threat taxonomy 
with various terminologies that categorized by 
combining a few related terms of insider threat, 
including access, motivation or inspiration of threats, 
the indicator used by insiders, types and activities 
performed, user profile categorization, methods used 
and some detection techniques proposed to mitigate 
insider threats. For better understanding, the 
abovementioned of insider threat taxonomy has 
illustrated in Fig. 2 below. 
 
 
Fig. 2 The taxonomy of insider threat (adapted from [10]) 
 
The element in an access category includes whether 
the insider intentionally or unintentionally get 
physical access or network access to be inside the 
organization before launch any harm or threat. Other 
than that, in motivation category, each of the 
motivation are different as it depends on the type of 
insider. For example, the motivation of disgruntled 
employees, mostly because of the unsatisfied feelings 
towards organization which led them to hold grudges 
and at last performed threat that gives bad impact to 
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the performance of the organization. While for fraud 
threat, the employee usually used the access provided 
to distract the financial sources of organizations for 
their own benefits. 
In addition, [10] also highlighted some of insider 
threat indicators, including personality traits, verbal 
behavior, deliberate markers, meaningful errors and 
correlated of usage patterns. Moreover, the types and 
activities performed by insider have been categorized 
into masquerader, alteration, the traitor, the elevation, 
snooping type of insiders, distributed threats and 
unintentional. Those types of insider performed 
different kind of threats activities which also has a 
relation to their motive of threats towards the 
organizations or target. Other than that, author [10] 
also has categorized some of insider profiles, which 
are pure insider, associate insider, affiliate insider and 
affiliate outsider. In addition, for the methods used by 
insider has been divided into user commands which 
insider used some programming commands, 
information exchange where the insider decide to 
obtain some information using any kind of tricks, 
make use of organizations vulnerabilities and develop 
kind of program such as a logic bomb to be released 
in network anytime.  
Along with the studies carried out by authors [3] 
and [10] above, [11] stated that many companies still 
depend on the preserved management and production 
systems, resulting in a dramatic increase in the 
requirement of critical industrial protection systems 
and manufacturing outlines from cyber security 
threats that may include threat from inside. Other than 
that, [12] reported the system in industrial 
manufacturing claim a constant collaboration with 
different networked computing nodules, devices and 
human operatives. Therefore, the most effective 
approach is critical in order to guarantee the quality 
of production of an organization and the efficient 
work from every employee at each of the shop floor 
level as long as these employees do not have any 
insider threat characteristic that will harm the 
organization. Besides authors above, [13] also stated 
the important for the industry to grow into more well-
organized, modernize methods and mature innovative 
of products and services with satisfied quality. 
Unfortunately, there are many challenges need to face 
by an organization, including manufacturing in 
implementing these technologies such as the need to 
emphasize skills/knowledge among employee. This 
situation of pressure from the organization to the 
employee can also contribute to the development of 
insider motivation within employee themselves as not 
all of them can accept the changes made. Therefore, 
this motivates us to carry out the studies within the 
scope of protecting critical industrial system based on 
a few reviewed undertaken as mentioned above. 
Along with the studies, there is no standard 
framework that is available. Therefore, we proposed 
our framework based on insider threat categorization 
that stated by other researchers.  
Hence, this model can give a clear view on how 
encourages this capable insider to launch insider 
threat in an organization. Moreover, in viewing such 
components from the previous model, a researcher 
may obtain knowledge or ideas on how to design a 
framework for the categorization of insider threats in 
several groups as well as features. Furthermore, the 
researcher can use any identified insider threat model 
as CMO model above as a reference or guideline to 
produce with a framework for the future and better 
understanding in insider threat mitigation in any 
fields of work such as in manufacturing automated 
execution field. Therefore, this paper applies the 
studies on some insider threats features gathered from 
different factors that categorize as human factor, 
system factor and machine factor. A number of 
reviewed articles which fall under the 
abovementioned factor categories as one of insider 
threat contributor being highlighted systematically. 
Moreover, each factor has a variety of strategies in 
reviewing the probability of insider threats in order to 
produce a solution based on the studies undertaken. 
The features identified will be applied in creating a 
standard framework to give a general idea of where 
those insider threat features of factor can happen in 
manufacturing execution system. Moreover, the 
manufacturing execution system defined by author 
[14] as huge quality of data that coming from system 
and converted into useful information about the 
production of scheduling, material handling and 
quality samples. Unfortunately, there is no general 
framework that can be referenced for researchers to 
conduct future research based on automation 
manufacturing execution system related to insider 
threats involving the mentioned factors above. By 
taking note on how difficult to produce generalize the 
framework in such fields, the implementation of those 
factors in the proposed framework can be the 
guidelines in future study. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
This section will discuss on some factor that 
containing features that lead to insider threats known 
as human factors, system factors and machine factors. 
Each factor has a multiples kind of schemes in 
reviewing the possibility of insider threats in order to 
produce a solution based on the carried out studies. 
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2.1.Insider Threats Cause by Human Factor 
The human factor can be defined as a human 
behavior that behaves abnormally, which contribute 
to an insider threats actions. For instance, according 
to [15] insider threats has been referred to as an 
action to harm by trusted individual to the 
organization. Some of the researcher relates 
psychology and motivation for human to make this 
kind of threat shows that, the fact remains as it was 
difficult to predict who will perform or commit 
securities fraud [16] and severe employment crises 
contributed to exhibited signs of dissatisfaction and 
serious personnel problems months aforementioned to 
a threat [17]. The aim of this research is to assess an 
employee’s behavior associated with the risk of 
insider abuse with the use of prototype psychological 
model [15]. The advantages of this research area can 
provide clues or leads for officers to take action in 
advance of actual crimes, and also provide framework 
be considered for further analysis in the insider threat 
model. 
In addition to above author, [18] approaches the 
scope of insider threats into unintentional insider 
threats which define as a current or former employee, 
contractor, or business partner who has or had 
authorized access to an organization’s network, 
system, or data and who, through action or inaction 
without malicious intent, unwittingly causes harm or 
substantially increases the probability of future 
serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organization’s resources or assets, 
including information, information systems, or 
financial systems. The unintentional factors have few 
categorizations into organizational factor, i.e. work 
were set embrace inadequate properties and poor 
management systems [19] while lack of knowledge 
and memory failures and stress fall into human 
factors [20]. In addition, personality predispositions 
and demographic (age, gender) fall into psychosocial 
and demographic factors [15].  
Moreover, another researcher has derived on how 
the analyst proposed a relationship between Dark 
Triad personality traits, related constructs and 
external process experiences that derived from past 
collected works using formal modelling methodology 
that can determine the retrospective detection 
probability and viability of behavioral model [3]. 
From the previous research by [21] have resulted in 
the development of the Five-Factor Model (FFM) 
from a structure of personality and has 
comprehensive acceptance between personality 
researchers, including extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to 
experience [21]. The Dark Side is considered as a 
socially violent personality and are categorized as 
Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy which 
common personalities include socially vindictive 
character, self-promotion, emotional indifference, 
unfaithfulness and violence have ability to exploit 
others [22].  
Besides author above, [23] has proposed the 
taxonomies analysis can contribute to the association 
and the disambiguation of insider threat incidents as 
the protection solution used against them. The 
objective of their approach is to systems the 
knowledge gathered in insider threat research, but at 
the same time leveraging current stranded theory 
method for severe literature review. The proposed 
categorization follows workflow, including incidents 
and data sets, investigation of attackers, simulations 
or reproductions and defense solutions. There are few 
related research involves taxonomies such as the 
technique used by [24] is illustrated workflow 
between categories, proposed a structured taxonomy 
of insider threat incidents. The advantages of this 
paper are a unique fundamental taxonomy that 
subsidies to orthogonal taxonomy of incidents and 
defining the possibility of defense solutions employed 
against them and an updated outline of widely 
available data sets that can be used to examine 
detection resolutions against other works. Table 1 
below shows variety of human factors containing 
features that discovered. 
 
2.2.Insider Threats Cause by System Factor 
Besides the human factor that has been reviewed, 
there are also some researches focused on system 
factor that can lead to insider threats such as system 
failure or errors, operational activities or sequences, 
and so forth. There are various researchers have 
concerns about this factor and proposed different 
detection approach under the anomaly detection such 
as time-based, threshold-based and deviation-based 
against insider threats.  
As proposed by the author in [25] PRODIGAL has 
been configured to explore methods for unsupervised 
and semi-supervised anomaly detection to identify 
users who are possible to permit further investigation 
by discovering users who frequently perform near the 
upper of the anomaly recognition score list on 
multiple days. It has three levels of explanation need 
to be considered to support the analyst such as 
consists of pre-computed single feature detection 
scores which available for examination, a collection 
of features or sets of features contributed to anomaly 
score from an individual detector for individual users 
and combinations of the contribution from different 
type of detectors that are incorporated into the 
ensemble computation of overall anomaly scores. 
From the level of explanation and approachable 
methods, PRODIGAL can give sureness to detect 
recognized, assumed insider threat situations, 
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variations and the combination of situation [26].  
 
TABLE 1 
UNITS FOR MAGNETIC PROPERTIES 
Author 
 
Category of 
Features 
Proposed 
Solution 
Example of Features 
 [15] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employee’s 
behaviour 
 
 
 
 
Used predictions 
of a Bayesian 
model and a 
linear regression 
model to assess 
an employee’s 
behaviour 
Disgruntlement, anger 
management issues, 
disregard for authority, 
stress, personal issues 
and lack of 
dependability 
 
[24] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unintentional 
insider  
Threats 
 
 
 
 
Review of 
unintentional 
insider threats 
and divided into a 
few  
Factors 
 
Accidental disclosure of 
private and sensitive 
information, accidental 
loss of physical records 
and devices also reveal 
of information from 
social engineering 
[3] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
User 
Personality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dark Traits 
personality traits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Socially mean 
character, self-
promotion, emotional 
sensitivity, betrayal and 
aggressiveness which 
this behaviour due to 
lack of guilt, lack of 
understanding and 
empathy have intention 
to exploit others. 
[23] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insider threat 
incidents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High profile of 
data leakage and 
unintentional 
insider 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual and political 
gain, ignorant, revenge, 
lack of training, 
excessive workload, 
personal problems 
which include type of 
malicious insider such 
as traitors and 
masquerades. 
 
 
Moreover, [27] proposed Corporate Insider Threat 
Detection (CITD) system which is capable of gaining 
a general feature set that characterizes the user’s 
current activity in the organization at former time 
steps and amongst several users. The comparison 
between extensive ranges of different metrics is to 
evaluate the amount of anomaly that was displayed 
through each of them. Notifications are produced for 
the researcher based on different taxonomy structures 
of the anomaly metrics plus with both threshold and 
deviation-based assessments. Other than that, this 
approach produces response circle to reconfigure the 
increments connected with different anomaly metrics 
which was based on the anticipated conclusions of the 
analyst [27].  
In addition, another author [28] has proposed the 
probabilistic modelling structure for examining 
malicious occasions performing in interdependent 
critical organizations as latter critical infrastructures 
(CI). Even though the effort on ensuring these critical 
infrastructures operate smoothly, the possibility of 
possible threat, including an insider threat to happen 
is still possible due to exposure to threat such as 
faults or system failures. The threat to interrupt with 
CI also given a huge measure of outages or even loss 
of control in the case of a cooperated manufacturing 
control system [29]. Because of that, [28] has 
proposed a model with the relation between data 
streams that focused on the programmed handling of 
quick detection using hidden Markov Model (HMM) 
considerations of linear time in variant (LTI) models 
to estimate the interactions. The system is also 
capable to recognize whether there is unfairness in 
the prototype or not since it depends on the 
possibilities of the group of models implement in the 
proposed method.  
Other than that, [30] has proposed the method that 
is based on finding the possible failure threats and 
define the effect of each error on the Physical 
Protection System (PPS) effectiveness. Along with 
that, the features used was at the source of Estimate 
of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) 
technique, the technique of Estimate and Prevention 
of the Insider Threats (EPIT) recommended for the 
best approximation of insider threats. By modifying 
the EASI approach through the addition of a risk rate 
of the management that based on the outcomes of the 
computable investigation of insider threats, a practical 
staff organization system is required to control the 
performances of the employee. Table 2 below shows 
variety of system factors containing features that 
discovered. 
 
2.3.Insider Threats Cause by Machine Factor 
Apart from human and system factors, author [31] 
has reported some of technical attempt by an insider 
to disable monitoring machine in some organization 
which might be related to manufacturing fields. This 
is because technical control such as a keyboard or 
mouse devices that attached to certain main machine 
in an operation is usually exposed to someone who 
can reboot the host computer that the hypervisor is 
running on an and insider easily gets the opportunity 
to alter some of the security settings for the 
hypervisor. In that case, insider who basically has 
potential ability can disable defense tools first before 
being able to disrupt or shut down or undertaking the 
machine used on their workstation [31]. Therefore, 
the author (Crawford & Peterson 2013) proposed a 
technique to determine whether insider threat. 
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TABLE 2 
FEATURES ON SYSTEM FACTOR 
Author 
Detection 
Approach 
Category of 
Features 
Proposed 
Solution 
Example of 
Features 
[26] 
 
 
 
 
Data 
processing 
behavior 
 
 
Repeated 
improper 
behavior 
 
 
Data 
processing 
and anomaly 
detection 
components 
Communicatio
ns patterns 
 
 
 
[27] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threshold 
based and 
deviation 
based 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operationa
l procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment 
of 
observations 
at time steps 
and 
processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Server 
operation, 
capability of 
logging user 
activity 
includes what 
resources 
accessed and 
at what time 
of the access, 
threshold and 
deviation-
based 
anomalies 
[28] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time based 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disruption 
between 
incoming 
data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimate 
between the 
precise nodes 
over 
repeated 
time frames. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial of 
services, false 
positive rate, 
false negative 
rate and 
detection 
relay, 
electrical 
power 
systems, 
disruptions of 
sensors and 
actuators. 
[30] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk based 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure of 
proper 
production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organized 
documentati
on for the 
specific 
estimation of 
insider 
adversary 
behaviors 
among 
protective 
devices 
The threat of 
adversary and 
the 
vulnerability of 
defense 
devices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
detection can be performed on a Windows guest 
virtual machine (VM) through virtual machine 
introspection (VMI). An introspection tool or 
machines called as Virtual Machine Introspection 
(VMI) are a tool or machine that remains transparent 
and difficult to notice by the guest and are extremely 
difficult to subvert. With VMI, even users with full 
authorization or permission are unconscious or 
unaware of the monitoring abilities of the VMI tool 
and are not able to compromise them. 
Besides that, author [32] has proposed the defense 
mechanism the front end of line (FEOL) integrated 
circuit and back end of line (BEOL) implementation 
in the equipment to ensure the improve proposal has a 
high error rate and the output close by considering 
cell organization, directionality of connections to 
regulate the FEOL data from the BEOL data.  FEOL 
was used in untrusted platform and BEOL in a trusted 
platform and both connected in a thread called as 
proximity threat to recover leak connection between 
them. The threat has made the component of physical 
proximity FEOL exploited [33]. The experiment 
started by launching FEOL threats by an untrusted 
BEOL platform. Next, comparable looking FEOL 
mechanisms were designed for defense against the 
projected threat which next improves defense 
procedure to lessen interruption overhead and 
capitalize on security. The defense mechanisms used 
are naïve defense, delay aware defense and secure 
aware defense [32].  
There are also some of the researchers that look 
into the case of threats that happened in some 
organizations which use Supervision Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) approach. Accordingly, 
[34] has divided the insider threats into two parts 
which unresolved alarms threat defines as the minute 
of operator has no intent of eliminating the inbound 
alarms by means of interruption or delay of threat and 
incorrect or incomplete threat and misconfiguration 
threat defines as when the worker attempts to produce 
misconfiguration or alarms through overload threat, 
outage threat and incorrect setting threat. Overload 
threat happened when wrong modification of 
topology and load transmission, which possibly will 
be the reason of overload or a power disaster in a 
huge area, outage threat as when insider opens the 
output feeders and incorrect setting threat reported as 
inappropriate equipment settings that can be a reason 
to equipment improper operation. Due to the previous 
analysis on what this kind of threat capability to do 
through a machine, [35] has proposed method called 
statistical anomaly detection method (SADM) in 
electric power of the SCADA system by doing 
simulation using substations level and transmission 
organism scenario. Table 3 below shows variety of 
machine factors containing features that discovered. 
Other than author above, author [36] has explained 
split manufacturing is a reliable technique to preserve 
against threats in manufacturing based mischievous 
activities such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and 
insertion of hardware Trojans which also can be 
helpful to faces insider threats. In fact, there are many 
losses in finances due to IP piracy, which also have 
become one of the concerns in both commercial and 
military fields [37]. Therefore, author [36] has aimed 
to produce the premiere level of security while 
ensuring acquires the highest outline in the clouds. 
The method used for the proposed approach by 
providing the theoretical structure for computing the 
outline level flexibility against any closeness 
prompted information outflow through the centric 
placement techniques targeting to make split 
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manufacturing protected against any nearness threat 
despite the fact of certifying practicality. Different 
from previous approaches, the analyst presented two 
real world outline techniques towards secure split 
manufacturing, which coloring graph of gate-level 
and clustering the same type of the gates contribute to 
accomplishing particularly improved trade-offs for 
outline rate and security [36]. Table 3 below shows 
variety of machine factors containing features that 
discovered. 
TABLE 3 
FEATURES ON MACHINE FACTOR 
Authors 
Category of  
Features 
Proposed  
Solution 
Example of features 
[47] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical impact 
against machine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determination 
on insider threat 
detection 
 
 
 
 
 
Disable monitoring 
machine before 
being able to 
disrupt or shut 
down or 
undertaking the 
machine used on 
their workstation 
[32] 
 
 
Old security 
features and 
network 
prototype 
Improve defense 
procedure 
 
Exploitation of 
physical attack and 
IP theft 
 
[35] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unresolved 
alarms threat and 
misconfiguration 
threat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation on 
two scenarios of 
insider threats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unresolved alarm 
(delay attack and 
incorrect or 
incomplete attack) 
and 
misconfiguration 
attacks (overload 
attack, outage 
attack and incorrect 
setting attack) 
[36] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical 
structure for 
computing in the 
machine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The latter 
theoretical 
structure for 
computing the 
outline level 
flexibility against 
any closeness 
prompted 
information 
outflow from 
inside 
Intellectual 
property piracy or 
theft 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. FRAMEWORK OF AUTOMATED 
MANUFACTURING EXECUTION SYSTEM 
In this section we will create an illustrated standard 
framework involves in the automated manufacturing 
execution system and relate the framework with 
contributing factors. In addition, the study of 
contributing factors of possible insider threats that 
can be relate in manufacturing fields has been divided 
into human factors, system factors, and machine 
factors accordingly.  The example of scenario created 
is as shown in Fig. 3 below. 
The framework designed below called as 
automated manufacturing execution system control 
consisting two major phases which is tracking and 
ordering system in which the data inserted into the 
server before proceeding to car production system. As 
illustrated on the left side of the figure, the admin will 
release the related data throughout the system which 
have a connection that link to the database.  
Next, the database server will feed in the data to the 
application server, once the instruction from human 
(admin) via the system application is received. The 
application server will analyze and deliver the related 
data to related production shop such as engine, 
stamping, welding, painting or trimming throughout 
the switch.  
The switch normally employed to send the data to 
the related destination as there is several productions 
Master Programmable Logic Control (MPLC) 
geographically distributed. A bunch of data will be 
stored into MPLC register known as buffering as 
storage medium. The data will be delivered to the 
rightful machine in an order of first-in-first-out 
(FIFO) manner. The buffer will be updated with new 
data from the server frequently, which based on n-1 
concept. For example, if the buffer consisting 10 data 
of N, whenever the data reduce to 9 (10-1), the 
MPLC will request new data from the server.    
The data delivered by the switch in string form 
unable to understand by the machine. Therefore, this 
information will be translated by the MPLC into 
readable form, i.e. 0 and 1 which next orders the 
machine to conduct the production.  
Upon completion of production of the machine, 
there must be cycled to notify/feedback shows the job 
has made as well as requests for new data. As such, 
the machine will send completion signal to the MPLC 
and at the same time request for new data. The 
completed task feedback will further escalate to the 
DB Server from the MPLC through the Switch and 
Application Server. The admin can check these 
complete of the activity for tracking purpose 
throughout the tracking system as shows above.  
Moreover, in this illustrated framework also has 
shown some of the involvement of contributing 
factors that contain some features of insider threats 
within illustrated standard framework involves in 
AMES will be explained for better understanding of 
where those possible threat can happen. Other than 
that, the illustrated standard framework also can be as 
a reference to another researcher on insider threats 
study. The three main factors have been divided into 
A (human factor), B (system factor) and C (machine 
factor) accordingly as shown in Fig. 3 below. 
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Fig. 3 Standard framework involves in Automated Manufacturing 
Execution System (AMES). 
 
In contact with human features in phase A, the 
effort of any organization or even in the 
manufacturing itself have put their employee to apply 
the best practice, impactful yet systematic work 
environment, but an important component that can 
assume as a major factor in the peaceful working 
environment is the human or employee emotion [38]. 
For example, as to relate to above framework, the 
employee, i.e. admin or line worker could be feeling 
stressed [15] as a consequence of their fault or 
mistakes in production activity by their higher 
management. Therefore, the employee can perform 
threats (Admin) to take revenge against their 
employer by disrupting the smoothness of process in 
manufacturing production systems.  
Other than that, the performance and judgment of 
the employee can be affected by physical conditions 
that have a connection to emotional impact due to 
exhaustion or sleepiness which can raise the chances 
of human inaccuracy [39]. For example, if the worker 
does not have enough sleep or rest, he/she can be 
emotionally sensitive [3] and can be less effective 
during work performance, which then lead to make 
mistakes. The situation can become worse when 
employees cannot tolerate with working pressure [23] 
in manufacturing production fields that provide a 
worker with low financial support or monthly 
payment. These kinds of situations can fire up insider 
passion or greed to perform threat for their own 
benefits [40] and [3] such as accidentally expose 
private information [24] i.e. the technical process of 
car production to competitors as he/she think that 
they can gain more in terms of finances.  
On the other view, drugs and alcohol also are might 
be reasons behind the threats launch from an 
individual and clearly it gives bad impact on 
employee work performance as it affects memory, 
focus, calculation, intellection, visuospatial talents 
and capability to follow composite understanding. 
Due to the increasing of dopamine levels also can 
affect the quantity of risk that people might take (Park 
2008). For example, the unintentional insert wrong 
data into the server (A) can cause wrong data 
uploaded to the application server (B) and MPLC (C) 
and finally result in wrong production or machine 
error. Therefore, from scenario shown above, those 
human factors that have been summarized can be 
expected to happen from the A to the C.  
Beside human factor explained above, the study 
also has been conducted on some features of system 
factor such as repeated improper behavior [26] which 
can be described as what consequences of system 
failure that contribute to the reputation of an 
organizational or production fields. Other than that, 
author [41] reported one of the contributing factors of 
system failure when employee frequently gives 
respond to any phishing email. For example, from the 
review of research papers above, we can relate to the 
framework as an employee might have 
conceptualizing problem on how the production 
works which involve operational procedure [42] with 
the system and next resulting in the documentation or 
production failure [43] because employee give 
respond to the malicious email.  
Other than that, the organization or company plays 
a big part in training their employees, especially on 
defensive strategies to any possible threat which 
might contribute harm to the organization [44]. For 
example, if the system used in production cycle faces 
some technical problem such as unexpected of wrong 
sequences [45] of information delivery, which 
supposedly from the database to the application 
server (B) but the data jump or skip application server 
and go directly to MPLC (C). This show how the data 
reached at the MPLC (C) from the server without 
analyzed by the application server (B) before being 
distributed to the related shop. 
Besides of human and system factors above, some 
literature review of machine factors also has been 
reviewed. According to [32], an organization or 
companies in manufacturing need to use updated and 
the latest version of a machine to produce more 
secure and effective working environment because if 
any, working fields, including manufacturing do not 
use the latest version of a machine with the latest 
security features, the chances or probability for the 
insider to have full knowledge of the machine’ 
vulnerabilities is huge. This kind of situation can be 
considered as must grab opportunity over the power 
of insiders have to perform threats easily. For 
example, from framework above, insider launches 
their threat to the old security features and network 
prototype used as he or she already acknowledges 
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vulnerability of machine used [32]. This threat can 
cause data flow or delivery of data from each stage 
have some disruption [46] and give wrong output 
from production system and also give effect to the 
performance of the company to their clients. From the 
explanation on how the tracking and ordering system 
starts from insertion of data by human (admin) to the 
respondent or a feedback cycle back to the database 
(A), the employee or can be named as insider can 
interrupt that process so the right data will not be 
delivered back to the server. This situation can 
directly affect the performance and reputation of the 
company.  
In addition, some of the related insider threats such 
as an unresolved alarms threat, misconfiguration 
threat and incorrect setting threat [35] also can be the 
cause to interruption between the machines itself 
[46]. Additionally, insiders also might technically 
attempt to disable monitoring machine before being 
able to disrupt or shut down or undertaking the 
machine used on their workstation [47]. For example, 
the insider wants to take over a machine that 
containing binary information from MPLC (C). 
Therefore, he/she shut down the monitoring first 
before taking over the machine (C) as he/she can 
exchange the converted information before 
proceeding to the next phase. Other than that, during 
the study also we can assume some of the accidents 
of failure of machines, such as power outages might 
also happen during the production system. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
From the review above has shown that there is no 
standard framework of the automated manufacturing 
execution system to classify the three factors into one 
main framework. There are a few reviews on 
manufacturing execution systems such as by [48] and 
[14] but not generalize in the automated 
manufacturing execution system. There are some 
effects from automated manufacturing execution 
system failure that can be assumed, such as 
downtime, production loss and productivity decrease. 
Unfortunately, these effects do not have any 
reference, including a standard framework to conduct 
future research. Therefore, the illustrated framework 
can be used as reference by other researcher to come 
out with a better solution that might have 
implementation of the internet of things (IoT) and 
cloud usage. 
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